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of the.

STATE OF UTAH
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Deceased,
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-vs.MORGAN EVANS,
Defendant and Appellant.
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DURHAM MORRIS
Attorney for Respondent
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IN THEI SUPREME, COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
ANNIE B. EVANS, as Administratrix
of the Estate of William H. Evans,
Otherwise Known as William Evans,
Deceased,
Pla~ntiff

and Respondent,

Civil No. 8802

-vs.MORGAN EVANS,
Defendant and .Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts made
by appellant regarding the issues in this case, with the
exception that in addition to suing for an undivided onehalf interest in the cattle branded 44 referred to in the
plaintiff's Complaint, plaintiff alleged in her Complaint
that the defendant had on or about August 3, 1956, and
after the date of the death of William H. Evans, wrongfully sold 8 head of cattle branded 44 without any authority or consent of the plaintiff, or anyone representing
the estate of William H. Evans, deceased, and that the
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defendant had wrongfully had a check In the amount
of approximately $806.00 given by the purchaser of said
cattle in payment therefor, made payable to one Myrtle
Littlefield, a sister of the defendant, and that defendant
had wrongfully refused to account to the plaintiff for
any part of the proceeds of the sale of said cattle; that
the estate of William H. Evans, deceased, was the owner
of an undivided one-half interest in and to said 8 head
of cattle and was entitled to receive one-half of the proceeds from the sale of said cattle, and plaintiff further
alleged upon information and belief that the defendant
had since the date of the death of William H. Evans,
deceased, wrongfully sold additional cattle branded 44 ,
in which the estate of William H. Evans, deceased, owned
an undivided one-half interest, and had wrongfully appropriated to his own use the entire proceeds from the
sales of said cattle, and had wrongfully refused to account to the plaintiff for one-half of the proceeds thereof (Complaint Par. 5). Defendant in his Answer admitted that after the death of William H. Evans, deceased, he sold cattle, and that he has controlled the
distribution of funds received from said cattle, including
$806.00 which defendant had paid to 1\fyrtle Littlefield,
and admits he had refused to account to Annie B. Evans,
Administratrix of the estate of Willia1n H. Evans, deceased, for any part of the proceeds from the sale of said
cattle; defendant further adn1itted that he had sold cattle
without any authority or consent of the plaintiff, and
denied that such sales "\vere "\Yrongful, by reason of the
fact that defendant claimed to be the sole and exclusive
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owner of said cattle sold. (Answer and Counter-Claim
Par. 5). So that these were additional issues in the case.
Respondent disagrees with the Statement of Facts
made by appellant regarding the employment of counsel
for the plaintiff in connection with the Evans-Page
matter, and states the facts relating to said employment
to be as follows: that counsel for plaintiff was employed
by William H. Evans and Morgan Evans in about 1950,
in connection with the enforcement of a claim held by
them against D. G. Page and Verda Page for an alleged
breach of a cattle Lease Agreement, Plaintiff's Exhibit
1, for an alleged failure on the part of D. G. Page and
Verda Page to return to William H. Evans and Morgan
Evans the cattle, which they agreed in said Lease to return to William H. Evans and Morgan Evans, Lessors,
at the end of the term; that as a result of such employment a settlement was effected between William H.
Evans and Morgan Evans, Lessors, and D. G. Page and
Verda Page, Lessees, wherein D. G. Page and Verda
Page executed a Promissory Note secured by a Real
Estate Mortgage, to William H. Evans and Morgan
Evans, for the sum of $4800.00, payable $600.00 per year,
commencing December 27, 1950, with interest at 4% per
annum, payable annually; said Promissory Note and
Mortgage were left with said attorney for '.,bollection;
that at the time of the commencement of this action all
payments of principal and interest payable under said
Note and Mortgage had been collected, and remittance
made thereon to William H. Evans and Morgan Evans,
less the agreed collection commission, on a 50-50 basis,
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excepting the final payment of $600.00 principal, plus
some interest, which had not become due on the Note
and Mortgage at the time of the commencement of the
action or at the time of trial. In said employment said
attorney acted as attorney for both William H. Evans
and Morgan Evans, in 1 ~onnection with a controversy
in which William H. Evans and Morgan Evans were engaged on one side, and D. G. Page and Verda Page were
on the opposite side of the controversy. Respondent's
counsel never at any time acted as attorney for Morgan
Evans alone. (T. Page 10 to 13; T. Page 164 Line 17 to
Page 167 Line 21; T. Page 161 Line 6 to Page 162 Line
19).
Respondent and her counsel deny and take exception to the statements made in appellant's brief and during the trial of the action, to the effect that respondent's
counsel was guilty of unethical and unprofessional conduct in producing, having identified and offering in evidence, the Plaintiff's Exhibits hereinafter more particularly referred to, which were objected to by appellant's
counsel, and in a~:ccusing plaintiff's counsel of wrongfully
revealing the secrets of his client (Appellant's Brief,
Pages 4, 5, 6 and 7; T. Page 161).
Respondent and her counsel take exception to the
following statements set forth in Appellant's Brief pertaining to the Honorable Trial Judge, before \Yhoin the
case was tried: "The trial court on its own motion should
have stopped the trial at that time and discharged the
jury, and failing to do so has done irreparable dan1age
to the defendant's substantive rights inasmuch as it
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would now be impossible to retry this matter in Beaver
County and that the volunteering of this information
by counsel has now made plaintiff aware of same to
where on a retrial same could be subpoened." (Appellant's Brief Page 4). "However, the trial court was never
able to see this matter and ruled as though the attorney
had been subpoened into court with the information."
(Appellant's Brief Page 5). "After a great deal of deliberation that undersigned cannot come forth with the
thought that the trial judge, that heard this matter, intentionally allowed this type of violation and disregard
of the client's rights and all that an attorney holds
sacred. . . ." (Appellant's Brief Pages 5 and 6). Respondent contends that there is no odeasion or justification for any such statem~nts or references being made
concerning the Honorable Trial Judge who presided at
the trial.
STATEMENT OF RESPONDENT'S POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES
POINT 1
Appellant has the burden of pointing out the error
or errors upon which appellant relies, as error on the
part of the trial court is never presumed, and in this case
appellant has failed to point out any error or errors on
the part of the trial court in ruling upon the admissibility of evidence, or otherwise, which would require or
justify a reversal or modification of the judgment of the
trial court, and hence the judgment should be affirmed.
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POINT 2
If the Honorable Supreme Court is required to
search the record on appeal in an effort to find any ruling or rulings of the trial court which were erroneous or
in an effort to find any failure of duty on the part of the
trial judge, whlch would require a reversal or modification of the judgment of the trial court, which respondent
denies, and if the entire record is so searched, then· no
error or errors on the part of the Honorable Trial Judge
can be found which would require or justify a reversal
or modification of the judgment. Respondent contends
that Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 24, 25, 26, 27, 37 and 39, objected to by appellant's counsel on the ground that they
are "privileged communications," are not "privileged
communications" as between Morgan Evans and William
H. Evans, or between Morgan Evans and the plaintiff
administratrix of· the estate of William H. Evans, deceased,- or b.etween them, or either of them, and their joint
or common·eouns-el, and being non-privileged communications. it wa·s not unethlfcal or improper for counsel for
the respondents to produce said Exhibits, to have them
identified and· to' offer· them in evidence in behalf of the
plaintiff, the personal representatives of \Villiam H.
Evans,- deeea'sed, and· that said Exhibits were properly
admitted in evidence, for the follo". .ing reasons:
A: Said Plaintiff's Exhibits, objected to on the
ground that they are privileged communications, show
on their face and by their context that they contained
nothing of a confidential nature as between William H.
Evans and Morgan Evans. There are no secrets or con-
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fidential information contained in any of these instruments, which their joint or common counsel was·expected
to keep from the other. In f31ct said Plaintiff's Exhibits
show on their face that they were intended to be the
common property of both, and that the contents of said
documents were intended to be communicated to both.
Being non-privileged communications, either party had
a right to use such documents in a suit brought by one
against the other, or their personal representatives, providing they are material to the issues presented.
B: Said Plaintiff's E·xhibits, objected to on the
ground that they were privileged communications, were
either placed with or communicated to counsel for respondent while he was employed as joint or common
counsel for both William H. Evans and Morgan Evans,
in a controversy in which William H. Evans and Morgan
Evans were parties on one side, and D. G. Page and
Verda Page were parties on the other side of the controversy, and such documents left with or communicated
to their common counsel are not privileged communications as between such joint litigants, or between them and
their joint or common counsel, and such documents may
properly be used in evidence by or in behalf of either
party in a suit between themselves, or their personal
representatives.
POINT 3
The witness J. Pratt Allred was subpoenaed into
court and required to bring with him and to identify
documents which proved facts beyond facts admitted in
the pleading, namely, documents which assisted in prov-
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ing the joint ownership of the cattle in dispute by William H. Evans and Morgan Evans, and hence he was a
necessary witness for the plaintiff, and defendant's objection to the cost item of $6.00 witness fee and $12.00
mileage for this witness was properly overruled and
denied.
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF POINT 1
PALFREYMAN v. BATES & ROGERS CONST.
CO. et al. 158 P. 2d 132,-108 Utah 142.
2. Judgment of a trial court is presumptively correct and every reasonable intendment
must be indulged in favor of it, and burden of
affirmatively showing ·error is on the party complaining thereof.
3. Reviewing court does not look with favor
upon the cause of a litigant who raises points and
casts them in the lap of the court for research and
determination, and, if this is done, it is within
discretion of the court to refuse to consider them.

BURTON v. ZIONS COOPERATIVE ~IERCAN
TILE INSTITUTION, 249 P. 2d 514, 122 Utah
360.
6. Judgment of trial court is presumptively
correct, and every reasonable intendment must be
indulged in favor of it, and burden of affirmatively showing error is on party co1nplaining
thereof.
REID et al. v. ANDERSON et al., 211 P. 2d 206,
116 Utah 455.
8. Appellant's counsel, asserting trial court's
error, has burden of showing error, and Supreme Court has no duty to search record for
error.
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STARTIN v. MADSEN, 2·37 P. 2d 834, 120 Utah
631.
7. To entitle an appellant to prevail, he must
show both error and prejudice, that is, that his
substantial rights are affected and that there is
at least a fair likelihood that the result would
have been different.
COOMBS v. PERRY, 275 P. 2d 680, 2 Utah 2d
381.
On appeal, judgment and proceedings in the
lower court are presum.ed to be correct and burden is upon appellant to show error.
LAWRENCE v. BAMBERGER R. CO., 282 P. 2d
335, 3 Utah 2d 247.
Every reasonable intendment ought to be indulged in favor of validity and correctness of
judgment under review, and it will not be disturbed unless appellant meets his burden of affirmatively showing error.
For other Utah cases to the same effect see:
Buchanan v. Crites, 150 P. 2d 100, 106 Utah 428;
Tatsuno v. Kasai, 259 P. 318, 70 Utah 203;
Bush v. Bush, 184 P. 823, 55 Utah 237;
Murray v. Finlayson, et al., 273 P. 319, 73 Utah
232.
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
POINT 2-A
PEOPLE v. HALL, 130 P. 2d 733, California
1942.
14. To be "privileged" the communication
between an attorney and client must be confidential and so regarded at least by the client at the
time, and if it clearly appears that the communication was not intended by the client to be confidentia,_, it was not privileged.
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17. Where attorney represented two different clients~ attorney's letter to one of them demanding an accounting for the other client was
not a "confidential communication" between attorney and addressee, neither was a letter written by addressee to attorney and the other client.
RAMSEY et ux v. MADING et ux., 217 P. 2d 1041,
Washington 1950.
5. Only those communications between attorney and client which are intended to be confidential are protected by statutory privilege.
ANDERSON v. THOMAS, 159 P. 2d 142, 108
Utah 252.
11. No express request for secrecy is necessary to make communications between attorney
and client confidential, but such relationship alone
does not raise presumption of confidentiality, and
the circumstances must indicate whether, by implication, the communication was of a sort intended to be confidential. Utah Code 1943, 10449-3 (2').
CLYNE et al v. BROCK, et al., 188 P. 2d 263,
California 1947.
9. Where persons have mutually employed
same counsel and have discussed freely their
problems in presence of one another and their
counsel, reason for rule of privilege has been destroyed, since each party by such concerted action
thereby has waived right to place such communications under shield of privilege.
PARNACHER et al. v. MOUNT, 248 P. 2d 1021,
Oklahoma 1952.
5. The statutory rule that attorney is incompetent to testify concerning communications
made to him by client in such relation is inappli-
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cable to such communications openly made in third
persons' presence, but communications,· to enjoy
protection of statute, must be made in confidence
of relation and under circumstances implying that
they should ever remain secret.
·
HILL v. HILL, 107 P. 2d 597, Colorado

~940.

3. Communications made to an attorney by
client for purpose of being conveyed by attorney
to others are not "privileged communications''
within contemplation by statute concerning testimony of attorneys as to communications by clients.
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF·
POINT 2-B
CUMMINGS v. SHERMAN, et al., 132 P. 2d 998,
Washington 1943.
6. Generally, where two or more clients employ the same attorney in the same matter, communications made by them in relation thereto are
not "privileged communications" inter sese, since
by selecting the same attorney each party "waives''
his right to place those communications under the
shield of professional confidence.
Language of the Court: ( 6) The general rule
is stated in 28 R.C.L. 566, Sec. 156, as follows:
"When two or more clients employ the same attorney in the same matter, communications made by
them in relation thereto are not privileged inter
sese. By selecting the same attorney, each party
waives his right to place those communications
under the shield of professional confidence. The
reason assigned for the rule is that, as between
the clients, communications made for the mutual
benefit of all, lack the element of confidentiality
which is the basis of privileged communications.
Ordinarily the attorney for both parties is not the
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depositary of ·confidential communications from
either party which ought to be withheld from the
other. . . ."
CROCE v. SUPERIOR COURT IN AND FOR
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,
68 P. 2d 369, c·alifornia 1937.
2. When two or more clients employ the
same attorney in the same business, communications made by them in relation to such business
are not privileged inter sese, and such communications are not privileged as between any one of the
parties and the attorney.
Language of the Court: (2) But it appears
to be well settled, as stated in Thornton on Attorneys at Law (vol. 1, p. 183), that: "When two or
more clients employ the same attorney in the same
business, communications made by them in relation to such business are not privileged inter sese;
nor are such communications privileged as between any one of the parties and the attorney. It
is the secrets of the client which affect his right
that the law does not permit the attorney to divulge. By selecting the same attorney, and making their co~munications in the presence of each
other, each party '"'aives his right to place those
communications under the shield of professional
confidence." (Citing many cases) ... Therefore,
in the present case the eonnnunieations made by
parties united in a con11non interest to their joint
or common counsel, ,,~hile privileged against
strangers~ are not priYileged as bet,Yeen such
parties nor as bet,veen their counsel and any of
the1n, '\vhen later they assu1ne adverse positions.
JONES ON EVIDENCE \Tol. 3, Sec. 754, at Page
1362:
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Where several persons have employed the
same attorney to act for them, their communications to him are not ordinarily privileged inter
sese.
58 Am. Jur. Sec. 496, Page 277:
Sec. 496. - Suits between Clients or Consultants. - When two or more persons employ or consult the same attorney in the same matter, communications made by them in relation thereto are
not privileged inter sese. By selecting the same
attorney, each party waives his right to place
those communications under the shield of professional confidence. Either party may introduce
testimony concerning the same as against the
other, or his heirs or representatives. The reason
assigned for the rule is that, as between clients,
communications made for the mutual benefit of
all lack the element of confidentiality which is the
basis of privileged communications.
To the same effect see: 97 C.J.S. Witnesses 281,
page 795.
ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF POINT 1
As shown by the authorities above cited in support
of Point 1, the appellant has the burden of affirmatively
showing error on the part of the trial judge, and if appellant fails to do so the judgment should be affirmed. The
appellate court is not required to search the record on
appeal in an attempt to find error. Yet in this case appellant's counsel has failed to point out any ruling or
rulings of the trial court on the admission of evidence,
or otherwise, which appellant contends are erroneous.
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~ppellant's

counsel has raised no objection to any of the
rulings of the trial court on the admissibility of some 46
'Exhibits which plaintiff offered, and which were received
in evidence, and has raised no objection on this appeal
to any other ruling of the trial judge. Appellant's counsel
has raised no objection to sufficiency of the evidence to
support the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the
trial court. On the upper half of Page 5 of Appellant's
Brief, appellant's counsel refers to approximately 113
pages of the transcript, and .doubtless desires that the
appellate court search these pages in an effort to find
some error on the part of the trial court. Appellant's
counsel states after referring to said extensive portions
of the transcript, "Objections were made at various
places on the basis of an existing attorney and client
relationship." But appellant's counsel does not allege
or point out any claimed error on the part of the trial
judge in ruling on the admissibility of the documents
objected to.
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF POINT 2
If the Honorable Supreme Court is required to pass
on the admissibility of Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 24, 25, 26,
27, 37 and 39, objected to on the ground that they were
"privileged communications," then the court must conclude that said Plaintiff's Exhibits were not "privileged
communications" FIRST because said Exhibits show
on their face and by their context that they contained
nothing of a confidential nature between William H.
Evans and Morgan Evans, and SECOND that such communications were either placed with or communicated to
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the common counsel of William H. Evans and Morgan
Evans, and as such were not privileged communications
between them, or between either of them and their joint
or common counsel.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, objected to on the ground that
it is a privileged communication, is a Lease of 33 head of
cattle, being a part of the Evans' herd branded 44 , made
and entered into between William H. Evans and Morgan
Evans, Lessors, and D. G. Page and Verda Page, Lessees.
The Lease is signed by all parties to the Lease. Certainly
this Lease is the common property of William H. Evans
and Morgan Evans, or their personal representatives.
The instrument contains no secrets or confidential information to be withheld from any party to the Lease,
and is not a privileged communication between William
H. Evans and Morgan Evans, or between them, or either
of them, arid their joint or common counsel who was employed in connection with the enforcement ·of the Lease.·
Appellant's counsel, in making an objection to the admis~·
sion of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 in evidence, accused respondent's counsel of "highly improper and highly unethical"
conduct in producing and offering this Exhibit in evidence. (T. page 161, Lines 9 to 17). Such accusations.
were absolutely false and groundless. The Lease objected·
to was so clearly admissible in evidence to aid in establishing the joint ownership by William H. Evans and
Morgan Evans of the cattle branded 44 that this was
beyond argument. The document did not bear any resemblance of a privileged communication between William H. Evans and Morgan Evans, or between either of
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them, and their joint or common counsel. It was neither
unethical nor improper for respondent's counsel to produce this Lease, to have it identified and to offer it in
evidence, and by making the wholly unwarranted personal attack above referred to upon respondent's counsel,
was not appellant's counsel violating the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar requiring that
all personalities between counsel be scrupulously avoided,
and requiring professional courtesy and respect be shown
by one member of the bar to another (Revised Rules of
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar Rule III,
Sec. 17).
Plaintiff's Exhibit 24, objected to on the same ground,
is a letter dated Feb. 1, 1952, written by W. H. and Morgan Evans to l\tforris & Matheson, Attorneys, of which
firm counsel for respondent in the present action was
then a member, regarding the Evans-Page item above
referred to, in which it is stated among other things "as
we have to buy hay for our cattle." This letter is in the
handwriting of Morgan Evans and is signed W. H. and
~{organ Evans. The letter shows on its face that it was
written in behalf of both William H. Evans and Morgan
Evans, and that said letter contains no confidential information as between William H. Evans and Morgan
Evans, and hence it is not a privileged co1nmunication
as between William H. Evans and ~forgan Evans and
their joint or common counsel.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 25, objected to on the same
ground, is a letter 'vritten by Morgan Evans regarding
the Evans-Page matter above referred to, to the joint
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or common counsel for William H. Evans and Morgan
Evans, in which Morgan Evans stated among other
things, "We have Record's to show where we had Registered Bulls with our cattle for over 20 years. You can
call any cattle dealer and look at our cattle at Adamsville,
and see the grade of cattle we have." This letter shows
on its face that it was written by Morgan Evans for and
in behalf of both Morgan Evans and William H. Evans,
and shows that it contains no information of a confidential nature which was to be withheld by the common counsel from either William H. Evans or Morgan Evans.
Both William H. Evans and Morgan Evans, or their
personal representatives, had a right to access to this
letter, and to know the contents thereof at any time. Such
letter is not a privileged communication as between William H. Evans and Morgan Evans, or between them, or
either of them, and their common counsel.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 26, objected to on the same
ground, is a letter written by Morgan Evans regarding
ihe Evans-Page matter above referred to, to the joint
or common counsel for William H. Evans and Morgan
Evans in connection with said transaction regarding the
division of the collections made by such joint counsel on
the Note and Mortgage made by Gary Page and wife
between William H. Evans and Morgan Evans (T. Page
178, Lines 2 to 24). In this letter Morgan Evans wrote
among other things, "While thinking it over probably best
to let him have his 50 per cent, and you can send me my
50% I will half to take a chance on the rest of his share
of the expense money." This Exhibit contains no in-
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formation which was intended by the writer to be kept
secret from William H. Evans, or his personal representative. In fact the subject matter of the letter is such
that it was intended as common information to both
William H. Evans and Morgan Evans, and was in no way
intended as containing privileged information as between
William H. Evans and Morgan Evans, or between them
or either of them, and their common counsel.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 27, objected to upon the same
ground, is a letter dated January 12, 1954, written by
Morgan Evans and W. H. Evans to Morris & Matheson,
Attorneys, of which firm counsel for respondent in the
present action was then a member, about the Evans-Page
matter above referred to. This letter is signed Morgan
and W. H. Evans, in the handwriting of Morgan Evans
(T. Page 175). This letter shows on its face that it was
intended to be the common property of both William H.
Evans and Morgan Evans, and that it contains no secrets
or confidential information intended to be withheld by
their common counsel from either of them. This letter
is not a privileged communication between William H~
Evans and Morgan Evans, or their personal representative, or between them or either of them and their common
counsel.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 37, objected to upon the same
ground, is a check made by Durham Morris, Trustee, to
William H. Evans and Morgan Evans, dated February
17, 1953, for $450.00, in connection with the Evans-Page
matter above referred to. This check shows on its face
that it was issued to William H. Evans and ~!organ
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Evans, payees, and is endorsed by both of them. (T.
Pages 225-228, and Pages 255-2·57). Certainly this is not
a privileged communication as between William H. Evans
and Morgan Evans, or as between them, or either of
them, and their common counsel.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 39, objected to upon the same
ground, is a check made by Durham Morris, Trustee, to
William H. Evans and Morgan Evans, dated March 2,
1954, for the sum of $450.00, in connection with the EvansPage matter above referred to, and was endorsed by both
payees (T. Page 222, Lines 9 to 24). This Exhibit is
in the same category as Plaintiff's Exhibit 37.
The materiality of the Plaintiff's Exhibits above referred to, objected to upon the ground that they were
privileged communications, is beyond argument. The defendant and appellant, Morgan Evans, in his Answer denied that William H. Evans owned any interest whatsoever at the time of his death in any cattle branded 44
referred to in the Plaintiff's Complaint (Defendant's Answer and c·ounter-Claim, Par. 2), and the defendant testified at the trial that William H. Evans never at any time
owned any interest in any cattle branded 44 (T. Page 354,
Lines 7 to 12; T. Page 447, Lines 8 to 11; T. Page 447,
Lines 8 to 11). The Plaintiff's Exhibits above referred to,
objected to on the ground that they were privileged communications, were offered in evidence, with other proofs,
to establish the continuous undivided 50-50 ownership
of the cattle branded 44 by William H. Evans and Morgan Evans for many years prior to the date of the death
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of William H. Evans, and to prove the absolute falsity
of the testimony of Morgan Evans above referred to.
Being non-privileged communications, and being material evidence in support of respondent's claim of ownership of an undivided one-half interest in the cattle
branded 44 , it was not improper for respondent's counsel
to produce, to have identified and to offer in evidence
the Plaintiff's Exhibits above referred to, and the Honorable trial judge committed no error in admitting them
in evidence and in submitting the case to the jury. It
would most certainly have been an error on the part
of the trial judge to have refused to submit the case to
the jury.
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF POINT 3
Appellant's counsel has argued that because the defendant and appellant admitted in his Answer and
Counter - Claim that the defendant and the decedent,
William H. Evans, were joint owners of the grazing permits for 20 head of cattle referred to in the Plaintiff's
Complaint, that J. Pratt Allred was an unnecessary
witness, and the $6.00 witness fee and $12.00 mileage fee
of said witness should have been disallowed. However,
the witness J. Pratt Allred was subpoenaed to establish
facts beyond the said admission in said pleading. The
defendant and appellant had denied in his Answer and
Counter-Claim that William H. Evans owned any interest
in the cattle branded 44 , and the witness J. Pratt Allred
'vas subpoenaed and required to bring with him all applications for grazing permits filed by Willia1n H. Evans
and/or Morgan Evans 'vith District Office of District
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No. 3 Utah, Bureau of Land Management, covering the
period from 1942, including the year 1956, and was required to also bring with him copies of all grazing permits issued to William H. Evans and/or Morgan Evans
during said period of time. Said witness did bring with
him 7 applications for grazing permits, which stapled
together were marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 32. These applications were the joint applications of W. H. and Mor~an Evans for permits to graze cattle on government
land, covering the period of time from 1942 down to and
including the year 1956. These instruments shows on
their face that they were joint applications of William H.
Evans and Morgan Evans over said entire number of
years. The witness J. Pratt Allred also produced and
identified 6 grazing permits, which were issued to W. H,
and Morgan Evans to graze cattle on government land
from the year 1942 down to and including the year 1956.
These were stapled together and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 31. These documents produced and identified by
the witness J. Pratt Allred, and properly admitted in
~vidence, were material evidence in establishing joint
ownership by William H. Evans and Morgan Evans of
cattle used in filling the permits, which ownership was a
major issue in this case. If these men did not jointly

own cattle, why did they over the years above mentioned
jointly make application for, and jointly obtain permits to
graze cattle on the public domain. The Exhibits produced
and identified by the witness J. Pratt Allred were very
material in establishing the joint ownership of the cattle
branded 44 , by William H. Evans and Morgan Evans,
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during the pe~iods of time covered by these applications
and grazing permits, including the year when William H.
Evans died, namely, 1956. The Court properly overruled and denied defendant and appellant's objections
to the cost item above referred to.

CONCLUSION
The appellant having failed to show any error on the
part of the Honorable trial Judge in ruling upon the
admissibility of evidence, or otherwise, which would require or justify the reversal or modification of the judgment of the trial Court, the judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

DURHAM MORRIS
Attorney for Respondent
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